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Abstract. Consumer cooperatives constitute a highly successful example of democratic
forms of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually organized as medium
and large-scale ￿rms competing with pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms in retail industries. This paper
models such situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer cooperatives maximize the
utility of consumer-members and distribute them a share of the pro￿t equal to the ratio of
their individual expenditure to the ￿rm total sales. We show that when consumers possess
quasilinear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically di⁄erentiated goods and ￿rms operate
with a linear technology, the presence of consumer cooperatives a⁄ects all industries output
and social welfare positively. The e⁄ect of cooperatives on welfare proves more signi￿cant
when goods are either complements or highly di⁄erentiated and when competition is ￿ la
Cournot rather than ￿ la Bertrand.
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1. Introduction
Since 1844, Rochdale pioneers￿idea of cooperation has spread around the world and today
more than 700 million cooperators are active through 100 countries (ICA 2006). Among
the various cooperative forms of enterprises, consumer cooperatives (henceforth Coops) are
typically ￿rms that operate in retail industries pursuing the institutional objective to act
on behalf of their consumer-members.
1 Nowadays these organizations represent one of the
most successful examples of democratic and participative forms of enterprises, able to com-
pete against well established and large-size pro￿t-maximizing companies. Formed through
a discontinuous process of sequential waves (see Finch, Trombley & Rabas 1998, for a brief
account of the US case) Coops are well established in several countries without in general
possessing a dominant position in retail industries, with a few exceptions such as Switzerland,
Finland and Japan. Given their operational large scale Coops usually operate oligopolisti-
cally in developed countries. The Cooperative Group in the UK is one of the world￿ s best
known consumer cooperative providing a variety of retail and ￿nancial services. Japan is
also known to possess a very relevant consumer cooperative movement with over 23.5 million
members and with retail cooperatives alone scoring a turnover of about 374 billion yens in
2006 (Japanese Consumers￿Cooperative Union, 2006). Italy￿ s largest group of consumer
cooperatives represents today a serious competitor to private companies operating in retail
industry. Among the top 30 Italian retail companies, 9 are consumer cooperatives, with a
recorded turnover of about 12.9 billion euro in 2009, corresponding to around 18% of total
market share (E-coop 2010). The European Association of Consumer Cooperatives estimates
approximately 3,200 consumer cooperatives active in Europe, (overall turnover of 70 billion
euro), employing 300,000 workers and serving about 25 million consumer-members (Euro
Coop 2008).
So far, the economic literature on consumer cooperatives (e.g. Enke 1945, Anderson,
Porter & Maurice 1979 and 1980, Ireland and Law 1980, Sexton 1983, Sexton and Sexton
1987, Farrell 1985, and more recently, Hart and Moore 1996 and 1998, Kelsey and Milne
2010, Mikami 2003 and 2010) has mainly focussed on the behaviour of these ￿rms under
either perfect competition, monopoly or monopolistic competition. However, retail industries
are characterized by large-scale companies in developed economies, therefore in most cases
modern Coops strategically compete against traditional pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms (henceforth
PMFs), thus giving rise to a speci￿c instance of mixed oligopoly.
2
To the best of our knowledge, there are no contributions speci￿cally dealing with mixed
oligopoly between Coops and PMFs with the exception of Kelsey and Milne (2008) and
Goering (2008). Kelsey and Milne (2008) study the e⁄ects of the presence of consumer-
shareholders on the ￿rm decision-making under both monopoly and oligopoly. They show
the presence of consumers among the ￿rm￿ s stakeholders may be a strategic advantage and
1Consumer-members are usually entitled to elect their representatives who participate in assemblies and
hire the (professional or non professional) managers running the ￿rm. In large Co-ops the assembly elects a
board of directors that, on its behalf, controls managers.
2The term mixed oligopoly is usually adopted to describe a market in which one or more publicly-owned
￿rms compete against PMFs oligopolistically. Publicly-owned ￿rms are assumed to maximize social welfare,
i.e the sum of consumers and producers￿surplus.(see, for a survey, Delbono and De Fraja 1990). Alterna-
tively, one can conceive a publicly-owned ￿rm as ￿nanced directly by all consumers through income tax. As
a result, the marginal-cost pricing only obtains in the special case in which the income of the median voter
equals the average income (Corneo 1997).CONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 3
ultimately increase ￿rm￿ s pro￿t. In their model consumers have non zero mass, and there-
fore act strategically. In contrast to their model, in our setup ￿rms are either pure Coops
or pure PMFs competing in a di⁄erentiated oligopoly. Coops maximize the utility of a rep-
resentative consumer, which is assumed atomistic, and therefore solely interested in his/her
consumer surplus. We will further analyze the di⁄erence between modelling atomistic and
non atomistic consumers later on in the paper.
The other paper, by Goering (2008), presents a homogeneous good duopoly between a
PMF and a non-pro￿t ￿rm assumed to maximize a parametrized combination of pro￿t and
consumers￿surplus. In the paper, such objective function is assumed exogenously.
3
A wide number of related papers deal with labour-managed ￿rms ￿ la Ward (1958) and
Vanek (1970) assumed to compete with PMFs in homogenous or di⁄erentiated good duopolies
(see Law and Stewart 1983, Okuguchi 1986, Cremer and CremØr 1992 and Lambertini 2001).
A few recent contributions model the behaviour of agricultural cooperatives under either
imperfectly competitive (Rodhes 1983, Fulton 1989, Sexton 1990) or mixed duopoly with
both homogeneous (Tennbakk 1992, Albaek and Schultz 1998) and vertically di⁄erentiated
goods (Fulton and Giannakas 2001, Pennerstorfer and Weiss 2007). In general, both labour-
managed ￿rms and farmer-cooperatives represented in these models are not assumed to act
on behalf of consumers. In the typical labour-managed ￿rm of the literature, worker-members
are assumed to maximize per-worker value added, which implies that labour-managed ￿rms
set their output more restrictively than standard pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. On the other hand,
agriculture cooperatives are generally modelled as ￿rms using the inputs received from their
farmer-members to deliver ￿nal goods to consumers. This objective function implies that
agriculture cooperatives possess an incentive to overproduce, since farmers do not internalize
their production externality on the ￿nal market price. However, if agriculture cooperatives
buy inputs on behalf of their members, strong similarities with consumer cooperatives arise,
as in this case they compete with pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms in selling inputs to farmers, who
here act as consumers. Empirically the presence of agriculture cooperatives increases sales
and reduces prices on input markets, breaking existing monopsonies (Hansmann, 1996).
Therefore, in this respect, some of the results of our paper may also be applied to agriculture
cooperatives selling inputs to farmers.
Our paper models a Coop as a ￿rm maximizing the utility of a representative (atomistic)
consumer that buys its good and receives a share of the ￿rm￿ s net pro￿t proportional to
the ratio of her individual expenditure to the ￿rm￿ s total sales.
4 As a result, every Coop is
shown to set in equilibrium a price equal to its average production cost, thus a⁄ecting the
equilibrium behaviour of rival PMFs. All ￿rms are assumed to possess a constant-return-of-
scale technology, and therefore in equilibrium every Coop sets a price equal to its constant
marginal cost. The marginal cost pricing rule emerges endogenously in our model. This
pricing rule makes our results comparable to those obtained in mixed oligopoly models with
state-owned and PMFs (CremŁr, Marchand and Thisse 1989, De Fraja and Delbono 1989).
The constant average cost assumption enables overcoming many of the issues related to
3Lo› er, Kopel and Marini (2010) explore the e⁄ects arising when consumers delegate a manager to
maximize a weighted sum of their aggregate utilities and total sales.
4In Coops this share takes the form of a patronage rebate applied to consumer-members￿purchases.4 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
Coops membership stability.
5 At the end of the paper we brie￿ y consider the e⁄ects that
may occur assuming increasing marginal costs.
The main purpose of our paper is to present a detailed taxonomy of the results obtained in
an oligopoly in which an arbitrary number of PMFs and Coops compete strategically either
in quantities or in prices and goods are di⁄erentiated. We show that, under consumers￿
quasi-linear preferences, the presence of Coops in the market positively a⁄ects both the
total output and total welfare of the given industries (and market prices negatively). Under
Cournot oligopoly and homogeneous goods it can be shown that the presence of Coops pushes
all PMFs out of the market (or, alternatively, obliges them to behave as perfectly competitive
￿rms) thus maximizing social welfare. When goods are di⁄erentiated, Coops e⁄ect on welfare
proves more signi￿cant when goods are either complements or highly di⁄erentiated and when
competition is ￿ la Cournot (in quantities) rather than ￿ la Bertrand (in prices). Based on
these results, we should expect consumer cooperatives to be more often present in markets
possessing such features.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3 and 4
present the main results of mixed oligopoly with quantity and price competition and Section
5 o⁄ers our concluding remarks.
2. The Model
2.1. Consumer Preferences. The demand side of the market is represented by a contin-
uum of atomistic consumers i 2 I, whose mass is normalized to one, i.e. I = [0;1]. Every
consumer is assumed to possess preferences de￿ned on (n + 1) commodities, n symmetrically
di⁄erentiated goods6 xk (k = 1;:::;n) and a numeraire y, expressed by the following utility






























k;and yi denote the individual consumption of these goods. Let ui (:) be smooth,
increasing and strictly concave in all xi
k;
7
If the available income of each i-th consumer (denoted yi) is su¢ ciently high, every in-
dividual inverse demand can be obtained from the ￿rst-order conditions of the problem



















k > 0 and k = 1;2;:::n:
5See Anderson, Maurice & Porter (1979), Sandler & Tschirhart (1981), Sexton (1983) and Sexton &
Sexton (1990). In our paper all consumers buy Coops￿goods and are therefore entitled to become members.
This assumption is in line with the typical "open door" principle holding in cooperatives. Moreover, given
the constant-return-of-scale technology, Coop e¢ ciency cannot be a⁄ected by favouring the entry or the exit
of members.
6A good here may also be interpreted as a bundle of goods sold by every ￿rm in the market.
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In (2.2) the price of good xk depends on the pro￿le of quantities (x1;:;xn) (the market is a
oligopoly) and not on every individual purchase xi
k of the good.
2.2. Industry. The retail industry consists of n ￿rms supplying n di⁄erentiated goods (or
bundles of goods), whose m are supplied by consumer cooperatives and (n ￿ m) by tradi-
tional pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. Let M ￿ N denote the set of all Coops and NnM the set of
all PMFs. As usual, PMFs are assumed to maximize their pro￿t
(2.4) ￿k (x1;:::xn) = pk (x1;x2;:::xn)xk ￿ ck(xk):
In general we will assume linear variable costs and zero ￿xed costs for all ￿rms. As an-
ticipated, Coops act on behalf of atomistic consumers, and every consumer is assumed to
receive a share of the Coop￿ s net pro￿t proportional to the amount of goods purchased over



























[pj (x1;:;xn)xj ￿ cj (xj)]:








































for xj > 0.
as long as the price charged by a j-th Coop is su¢ ciently high to generate non negative
pro￿ts, namely, for pj (x1;:xn) ￿
cj(xj)
xj . Expression (2.7) indicates that a Coop acting on
behalf of atomistic consumers sets its quantity to equate every consumer￿ s willingness to pay
for good j at its average cost, with the purpose to distribute the maximum consumer surplus
to consumer-members (which here are all consumers).
Once (2.7) is respected for every single consumer, the Coop aggregates it for all consumers







for xj > 0.
Since all ￿rms possess a constant-return-of-scale technology, every Coop makes total con-
sumers￿willingness to pay for good j equal to marginal cost.9
8Note that when prices instead of quantities are ￿rms￿choice variables, PMFs and Coops￿payo⁄s can be
expressed as a function of a price vector (p1;p2;::pn).
9Coop behaviour would be di⁄erent if assumed to act on behalf of all consumers together. In this case,
consumers could coordinate their actions to a⁄ect the prices of all goods in the market.6 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
3. Oligopoly with Quantity Competition
In order to study the implications of the simultaneous presence of both PMFs and Coops
in an oligopolistic market, let the following utility function represent the preferences of a
i-th consumer in the economy:10



























where ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 [1=(1 ￿ n);1] represents the degree of product di⁄erentiation. For
￿ = 0, goods are independent and for ￿ = 1 goods are perfect substitutes. Moreover, for
￿ < 0 goods become complements.
Let also all ￿rms k = 1;2;:::n possess identical strategy sets Xk = [0;1) and identical
technology, expressed by a linear cost function, ck (xk) = cxk with 0 < c < ￿.
By (3.1) and (2.3), the following individual linear inverse demand for every good k =
1;2;::;n is obtained







h = pk for x
i
k > 0:
Inverse market demand for one good can simply be obtained by integrating (3.2) over all
consumers i 2 I. Moreover, the FOC of problem (2.6) yields the following FOC for every
Coop producing the j-th good








Expression (3.3) is the FOC of a Coop acting on behalf of one atomistic consumer buying
its product. A Coop will decide its own market quantity aggregating (3.3) for all consumers.
3.1. The Benchmark Case: Oligopoly with all PMFs. We can start illustrating the
case in which all ￿rms are PMFs and the choice variables are quantities. Whereby ￿rms are
PMFs they simply maximize their pro￿ts with respect to the quantity of the k-th good,









(￿ ￿ ￿x￿k ￿ c)
where x￿k = (x1;x2;::;xk￿1;xk+1;::;xn), and therefore pure-PMF Nash equilibrium quan-
tities (x1;x2;:::;xn) are easily obtained as
(3.5) xk =
(￿ ￿ c)
2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
10See Shubik ans Levitan (1971), Vives (1984) and Dixit (1983) for further details on this utility
speci￿cation.CONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 7
for k = 1;2;::;n and prices are given by
pk (x1;:;xn) =
￿ + c + ￿c(n ￿ 1)
￿ (n ￿ 1) + 2
:
It is made evident by (3.5) that for ￿ = 1 the usual Cournot solution with homogenous
goods (xk = (￿ ￿ c)=(n + 1)) occurs, while for ￿ = 0 goods are independent and all PMFs
act monopolistically (xk = (￿ ￿ c)=2).
3.2. Mixed Cournot Oligopoly. Let us now assume that a group of m ￿rms in the market
(m ￿ n) turn into Coops accepting all consumers as their members. The market thus turns
into a mixed oligopoly in which m Coops compete against (n ￿ m) traditional PMFs.

































Exploiting the symmetry of the m Coop and of the (n ￿ m) PMFs, the following mixed




(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿
2 8h 2 NnM;
















￿ + c + ￿ (c(2m + n ￿ 2) ￿ ￿(m + 1)) + ￿
2 (m￿ ￿ c(n + m ￿ 1))
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿
2
for every PMF, respectively.
It can be proved that, in general, if goods are perfect substitutes (￿ = 1) the model yields
the extreme prediction that the presence of even just one Coop in the market pushes PMFs8 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
out of the market.11 This could, alternatively, be interpreted as if the presence of Coops
obliges all PMFs to adopt a perfectly competitive behaviour in order to stay in the market.
Either way, as the equilibrium price coincides with all ￿rms￿average and marginal costs,
every consumer￿ s willingness to pay for the homogeneous good is just equal to every ￿rm￿ s
marginal production cost thus implying welfare maximization (since u0 = c).
These results are condensed in the next proposition. As an additional observation, please
note that the total market output under mixed oligopoly X￿ =
P
k=1;::;n x￿




j + (n ￿ m)x
￿
h =
(￿ ￿ c)(n(1 ￿ ￿) + m)
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿
2:
For m = 0 the above expression coincides with pure n-PMF oligopoly
(3.11) X
￿(m = 0) =
n(￿ ￿ c)
2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
and for m = n the expression turns into pure n-Coop total quantity, with
(3.12) X
￿(m = n) =
n(￿ ￿ c)
1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
:
From (3.11) and (3.12) pure Coop oligopoly clearly yields higher output than pure PMF
oligopoly. Moreover, expression (3.10) makes clear that under mixed oligopoly the total
output increases monotonically with the number of active Coops in the market.
Proposition 1. Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities and homogeneous goods (￿ = 1), the
presence of even one single Coop in the market implies that all PMFs become inactive, the
industry output is greater than that obtained with all PMFs and the economy social welfare
is maximized.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
Moreover, some simple results can be obtained for the range ￿ 2 [0;1].
Proposition 2. Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities, for ￿ 2 [0;1] Coop output is always
greater than PMF output, namely, x￿
j > x￿
h for all j 2 M and h 2 NnM. Moreover, for
￿ 2 [0;1], x￿
j > xk ￿ x￿
h.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
3.3. Welfare Analysis: PMFs vs. Mixed Oligopoly. The analysis of social welfare
under mixed oligopoly with di⁄erentiated goods requires careful calculation of the interacting
e⁄ects of Coops and PMFs simultaneous presence on consumer surplus and pro￿ts in all
markets. By the property of quasi-linear preferences, consumers￿welfare can be measured
with no approximation by using consumers￿surplus which, in turn, corresponds to the value
of consumers￿utilities.
11Alternatively, one could assume that Coops are less e¢ cent than PMFs or that PMFs enjoy some sort
of cost advantage. In this case both types of ￿rms can co-exist also when goods are perfectly homogeneous.
(see for instance Cremer, Marchand and Thisse, 1998).CONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 9
Under a pure PMF oligopoly, for all k-th goods produced, total welfare (TWk) can be







pk(￿)d￿ ￿ pk (x1;x2;; ::;xn)x
￿
k + pk (x1;x2;; ::;xn)xk ￿ cxk
= U (x1;x2;; ::;xn) ￿ cxk + y:
Summing up the welfare generated in all n markets and using (3.1), the utility functions
aggregated for all consumers, we obtain
TW

















which, by the symmetry of all ￿rms, can be written as
(3.13) TW
PMF = (￿ ￿ c)n ￿ xk ￿ (1=2)
￿
n(xk)





In a mixed oligopoly, total welfare generated in all market managed by a j-th Coop is given by









































































































Now, plugging (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9) into the above expressions, we obtain the following






2 (3 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2 + y;







1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)



















and mixed oligopoly with m Coops and (n ￿ m) PMFs, respectively.
Expression (3.17) illustrates that social welfare in a mixed oligopoly accounts for the sum
of welfare yielded in (n ￿ m) markets in which PMFs produce plus welfare yielded in m
markets in which Coops are, in turn, active.
3.3.1. Welfare under Duopoly. For illustrative purposes we can focus on the case of mixed
duopoly compared to a pure PMF and to a pure Coop duopoly, respectively. The presence
of Coops can be relatively more bene￿cial in some circumstances than in others and, in
particular, for speci￿c levels of product di⁄erentiation. Using (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) we




2 (3 + ￿)
(2 + ￿)
2





















under mixed duopoly, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that in terms of total welfare a pure Coop duopoly (continuous line) outper-
forms both a pure PMF duopoly and a mixed duopoly for any degree of goods di⁄erentiation
which is obvious, considering that a pure Coop basically acts as a welfare maximizer.
[FIGURE 1 - APPROXIMATELY HERE]
As already proven in proposition 1, under mixed duopoly (dotted line) for ￿ = 1 (homo-
geneous goods), only the Coop remains in the market and welfare is, therefore, maximized.
Moreover, it can be noticed that the relative e¢ ciency of mixed duopoly versus pure PMF
duopoly (circled line) is higher when goods are either complement (￿ < 0) or highly di⁄er-
entiated. When goods become more and more homogeneous, the welfare loss determined in
a pure PMF versus a mixed duopoly or a pure Coop duopoly decreases progressively, yet it
never vanishes. Similarly, mixed oligopoly better and better approximates maximum social
welfare for goods becoming increasingly substitute.CONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 11
3.3.2. Welfare Comparison with More than Two Firms. The results obtained above still hold
with more than two ￿rms that compete ￿ la Cournot. It can be proven that the entry of
new Coops in the market is always bene￿cial to social welfare.
Proposition 3. Social welfare under mixed oligopoly increases with the number of m Coops
regardless of the number of n ￿rms active on the market.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
The positive e⁄ect of Coops on welfare still holds true when the total number of ￿rms in
the market increases. Figure 2 illustrates that the entry of new ￿rms, boosting competition,
always exerts a favourable impact on market welfare. Consequently, if the new entrants
are Coops, such impact is even stronger. Consumers should therefore exert pressure on
respective Coops to set up new selling units, thus increasing competition and welfare.
[FIGURE 2 - APPROXIMATELY HERE]
However, a simple comparison shows that when goods are substitutes (￿ > 0), the welfare
raised by a pure Coop oligopoly becomes less and less advantageous compared to a pure
PMF oligopoly when both n and ￿ increase. When competition is high (which happens for
high n and ￿) the di⁄erent forms of market do not perform so di⁄erently, and thus welfare
is not so far. See next proposition.
Proposition 4. When the total number of ￿rms in the market increases (higher n) and
goods become increasingly substitute (higher ￿), the di⁄erence between total welfare in pure
Coop oligopoly and welfare in pure PMF oligopoly progressively decreases.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
[FIGURE 3 - APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Figure 3 shows that when the number of ￿rms increases and goods become increasingly
substitutes, Coops become the relative welfare advantage yielded by Coops progressively
shrinks. Therefore, if Coops aspire to match consumers￿needs, we should see this type
of ￿rms more frequently in highly monopolistic markets in which goods are either highly
di⁄erentiated or complements.
In the next section, we consider the case of price competition.
4. Price Competition
It can be interesting to compare the case of quantity competition to the case of price
competition so as to verify whether di⁄erences arise. An obvious di⁄erence is that, when
goods are perfectly homogeneous, Bertrand competition yields the extreme prediction that
￿rms set prices equal to marginal cost, regardless of the objective functions of ￿rms competing
in the market.12 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
4.1. Oligopoly with all PMFs. When all ￿rms are PMFs, we ￿rst obtain the direct
demand for each k-th good as price function,
xk (p1;p2;::;pn) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ pk ￿ (n ￿ 2)￿pk + ￿
P
h6=k ph
(1 ￿ ￿)((n ￿ 1)￿ + 1)
for k = 1;2;::;n and ￿ 6= 1.12
As a result, all PMFs￿pro￿t function can be written as












￿(1 ￿ ￿) + c(n ￿ 2)￿ + c + ￿p￿k
￿ (n ￿ 2) + 1
where p￿k = (p1;p2;::;pk￿1;pk+1;::;pn).






(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(n ￿ 2) + c)
￿ (n ￿ 3) + 2
for ￿ 6= 1
pk = c for ￿ = 1;
with associated quantities:
(4.3) xk (p1;p2;::;pn) =
(￿ ￿ c)(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
and pro￿ts
￿k (p1;:;pn) = (pk ￿ c) ￿ xk (p1;:;pn) =
(￿ ￿ c)
2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))
(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
2 (1 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
:
4.2. Mixed Oligopoly with Price Competition. Again we assume that m ￿ n ￿rms
start behaving as Coops. By (3.1) and (3.4), we obtain the following direct demands for a
PMF h 2 NnM, given the price charged by other ￿rms,
(4.4) xh (p1;:;pn) =




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
and the price charged by a Coop j 2 M
(4.5) xj (p1;:;pn) =




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
for ￿ 6= 1.
By (4.4) we can write the pro￿t-function of a PMF as a function of prices,
12Since demands are not de￿ned for ￿ = 1, output level under homogeneous goods are simply de￿ned as
￿rms￿direct demands for prices equal to marginal costs.CONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 13
￿h (p1;:;pn) = (ph ￿ c)xj (p1;:;pn)








￿(1 ￿ ￿) + c(1 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 2))
2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3)
for ￿ 6= 1
p￿










(￿ ￿ c)(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))








(￿ ￿ c)(2 + ￿ (2n ￿ 3))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))
;
for every Coop, respectively.









2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (n ￿ 2) + 1)
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))
2 (1 + n￿ ￿ ￿)
:
Proposition 5. Under price competition and ￿ 2 [0;1], mixed oligopoly prices are, for all
￿rms, either lower than or equal to pure PMF oligopoly prices, namely, pk ￿ p￿
h ￿ p￿
j for
every j 2 M, h 2 NnM and k = 1;2;::n. Moreover, xj (p￿) ￿ xk (p) ￿ xh (p￿).
Proof. See the Appendix ￿
4.3. Welfare Comparison under Price Competition. For the sake of brevity, we con-
centrate in the Appendix all calculations of total welfare under price competition. We here
report the results of such calculations, which are not too dissimilar from those obtained in
the case of quantity competition. Total welfare under mixed oligopoly with an arbitrary











(1+￿(n￿1))(2+￿(n+m￿3)) | {z }
P
j2M TWj
In the expression above we have again decomposed the total welfare in two distinct parts.






2 (1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))(3 + ￿ (n ￿ 4))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
2 ;







(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2:
It can be noticed that pure Coop oligopoly always yields the optimum welfare, regardless of
whether competition is either ￿ la Cournot or ￿ la Bertrand. Again, for illustrative purposes,14 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
we use the duopoly case to highlight the main di⁄erences in welfare under price and quantity
competition.
4.3.1. Welfare in Bertrand Duopoly. The expressions for the total welfare under Bertrand




2 (3 ￿ 2￿)
















By plotting the above expressions does not yield particular di⁄erences versus the Cournot
competition case, except in that all types of markets (pure PMF-duopoly included), yield
the marginal cost pricing and then maximum welfare for ￿ = 1. Under Bertrand competition
and homogeneous goods we observe perfect "isomorphism" in all ￿rms￿behaviours.
[FIGURE 4 - APPROXIMATELY HERE]
An important di⁄erence between Bertrand and Cournot competition emerges in terms of
welfare loss for a pure PMF oligopoly versus a pure Coop oligopoly. As shown in Figure 4,
the loss is de￿nitively larger under quantity than under price competition and the di⁄erence
is particularly high when goods are reasonably homogeneous. This is the case in which the
presence of at least one Coop in the market is de￿nitively more bene￿cial under Cournot
than under Bertrand competition. Additional welfare comparisons between Cournot and
Bertrand oligopolies are provided in the Appendix.
[FIGURE 5 - APPROXIMATELY HERE]
5. Concluding Remarks
Although consumer cooperatives are, in general, well established in several countries, their
behaviour is still largely unknown and requires additional research, notably to identify the
e⁄ects of the strategic interaction between consumer cooperatives and traditional pro￿t-
maximizing ￿rms in oligopolistic markets. This paper has attempted to take a ￿rst step in
this direction, showing the main e⁄ects arising in a mixed oligopoly with pro￿t-maximizing
￿rms and consumer cooperatives competing either ￿ la Cournot or ￿ la Bertrand in markets
with heterogeneous goods. We have shown that the presence of Coops is particularly bene-
￿cial for industries output and social welfare in mainly two cases. The ￿rst under Cournot
competition and homogeneous goods when Coops behave so expansively to expel PMFs from
the market, or, if interpreted di⁄erently, to oblige them to behave as perfectly competitive
￿rms, setting a price equal to the marginal cost and making zero pro￿t as a result. In
the second case when market competition is relatively weak, namely when goods are eitherCONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 15
complements or highly di⁄erentiated and the presence of Coops appears particularly valu-
able, by increasing output and welfare considerably. In this paper we have also shown that
Coops a⁄ect total welfare comparatively more under Cournot than under Bertrand compe-
tition. Therefore, according to our model, consumer cooperatives are likely to behave not
too dissimilarly to traditional pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms in all retail markets in which goods
are highly (but not completely) homogeneous and competition occurs mostly in prices. As
a reaction to these market forces, Coops may attempt to propose their customers genuinely
di⁄erentiated goods and, consequently, enhance consumers￿welfare.
Some of the paper results call for further analysis. First of all, we have assumed throughout
the paper a constant return of scale technology for ￿rms. Some of the recent literature on
mixed oligopoly assumes decreasing returns of scale, thus implying increasing marginal costs.
In this case a Coop, with its typical output expanding behaviour, could prove endogenously
less e¢ cient than a PMF, thus imposing negative externality on the society. This e⁄ect
would be overturned if a Coop could be managed jointly by all consumers or by someone
acting on their behalf. In this case consumers would no longer be atomistic and could
play welfare-enhancing strategies, setting prices equal to marginal costs plus some distortive
e⁄ects arising from manipulating to their advantage the pricing of rival PMFs. Developing
a model of consumer cooperatives governed by coalitions of consumers acting strategically
may constitute a topic of great interest.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For the ￿rst result, note that if ￿ = 1, conditions (3.3) and









￿ ￿ (n ￿ m)xh ￿ c
m








￿ ￿ mxj ￿ c
(n ￿ m + 1)























+ 0 = (￿ ￿ c) >
P
k
xk = n(￿ ￿ c)=(n + 1)16 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
The economy social welfare is de￿ned as the sum of consumers￿surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts,

















































































which is also the maximum welfare obtainable in the market for ￿ = 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. The ￿rst result can be easily checked by direct inspection of
expressions (3.9) and (3.8). The second result can be proved by noting that, for all j 2 M
and k 2 N,
(6.4) x
￿
j ￿ xk =
(￿ (n ￿ m ￿ 1) + 2)(￿ ￿ c)
￿
￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿
2(n ￿ 1) + 2
￿
(￿ (n ￿ 1) + 2)
and expression (6.4) is always strictly positive for ￿ 2 [0;1] and n ￿ 2.





2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
￿
(￿ ￿ c)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿ (n + m) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1) ￿ 3￿
is equal to zero for ￿ = 0, since xk(￿ = 0) = x￿
h(￿ = 0) = (￿ ￿ c)=2, while for ￿ = 1,
xk(￿ = 1) = (￿ ￿ c)=(n + 1) > x￿
h(￿ = 1) = 0. Finally, straightforward manipulations show






￿(n + m ￿ 3) + ￿
2 (1 ￿ n) + 2
￿
(n(￿ ￿ 1) + 2)
> 0
for ￿
￿(n + m ￿ 3) + ￿
2 (1 ￿ n) + 2
￿
> 0
which is always satis￿ed for ￿ 2 (0;1). ￿
.Proof of Proposition 3. By ispection of (3.17), it can be observed that the welfare




2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 4) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1)
￿
￿
2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿





3 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 4) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1)
￿
￿
2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1)




2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1)
￿
>
> (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
3 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 4) ￿ ￿





2 + (2 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1)
￿
>
> (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ 1)
￿
which always holds for m ￿ n and ￿ 2 [1=(1 ￿ n);1]. ￿













2 (3 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))







(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2
which is monotonically decreasing both in ￿; for n > 1; and in n; for 1 ￿ ￿ > ￿(n), where
￿(n) is a level of ￿ not too far from zero (the higher the number of ￿rms in the market, the
closer ￿ to zero). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. By expressions (4.2), (4.6) and by Bertrand equilibrium prop-
erty, when goods are homogeneous (￿ = 1) no di⁄erence between mixed and pure oligopoly
equilibrium prices occurs, since pk = p￿
j = p￿
h = c: When goods are independent (￿ = 0) all
PMFs behave as monopolists under both pure and mixed oligopoly, with p￿
h = pk =
a + c
2
whereas, also in this case, Coops behave as a perfectly competitive ￿rm, setting p￿
j = c.




(￿ ￿ c)(1 ￿ ￿)m￿
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
;





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)￿
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))
2 > 0
for n ￿ 1: As to the second group of results, note that, for ￿ = 0





and, for every j-th Coops,
(6.5) xj (p
￿;￿ = 0) = (￿ ￿ c);
and therefore
xj (p
￿;￿ = 0) > xh (p
￿;￿ = 0) = xk (p;￿ = 0):
Moreover, for ￿ = 1 in all types of oligopoly the same quantities are chosen with
xk (p;￿ = 1) = xh (p
￿;￿ = 1) = xj (p
￿;￿ = 1) =
(￿ ￿ c)
n
:18 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
When ￿ 2 (0;1), a simple inspection of (4.3) and (4.7) shows that, for m ￿ 1,
xk (p) > xh (p
￿):
Finally, for ￿ 2 (0;1) see that
xj (p
￿) ￿ xk (p) =
￿
￿ (3n ￿ m ￿ 5) + ￿
2 (2m ￿ 4n + 3 ￿ mn + n2) + 2
￿
(￿ ￿ c)
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
whose both numerator and denominator are strictly positive within the de￿ned range of
parameters. ￿
Welfare under Cournot Competition































































which, by symmetry of all j-th Coop and all h-th PMF, can be written as
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2 (3 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2 + y;







1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
+ e y;
i.e., pure Coop oligopoly welfare.
Welfare under Bertrand Competition
By plugging (4.3) into
(6.7) TW
















2 (1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))(3 + ￿ (n ￿ 4))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
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Under a pure Coop Bertrand oligopoly with n ￿rms we obtain
(6.8) TW








where xk (e p) denotes Coop quantity under a pure Coop Bertand equilibrium(e p = e p1 ; e p2;:::e pn).







(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
:
Moreover, by using (4.7) and (4.8) and knowing that
TW













































A welfare comparison between Bertrand (6.9) and Cournot welfare (6.6) for (a ￿ c) = 1,





























when m = 1 (mixed duopoly). Firstly it is worth noticing that both expressions (??) and (??)
are not monotonic in ￿. Moreover, welfare di⁄erences between price and quantity competition
are generally larger under pure PMF duopoly than under mixed duopoly. In both cases such
a di⁄erence is high when goods are complements. When goods are substitutes, in a pure
PMF duopoly the welfare di⁄erence between Bertand and Cournot increases with ￿, and
only when ￿ is close to one does it starts to decrease. Conversely, in a mixed duopoly such
a di⁄erence ￿rst increases and then decreases to eventually disappear for ￿ = 1. These
qualitative results also hold for n > 2.20 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
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Figure 1 - Cournot competition: pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
duopoly total welfare (dotted line), for (￿ ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ = [￿0:5;1]:













Fig. 2 - Cournot Oligopoly: Mixed Oligopoly welfare for m = 2
3n (dotted line), m = n
4
(squared line) and m = n (optimum) (continuous line) for ￿ = 0:2, (a￿c) = 1, n = 1;2;::;50.CONSUMERS IN A MIXED MARKET 23











Figure 3 - Cournot competition: pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
triopoly total welfare with m = 1 (dotted line), m = 2 (squared line), for (￿ ￿ c) = 1 and
￿ = [￿0:1;1].












Figure 4- Bertrand competition: pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
duopoly total welfare (dotted line), for (￿ ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ = [￿0:5;1]:24 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI












Fig.5- Total welfare in a pure PMF duopoly under Cournot (circled line) and Bertrand
compettion (dotted line) compared to a pure Co-op market (continuous line) for (a ￿ c) = 1 and
￿ 2 [￿0:5;1]: